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The challenges presented by the COVID-19 epidemic have created a renewed interest in the de-
velopment of new methods to combat infectious diseases. A prominent property of the SARS-CoV-2
transmission is the significant fraction of asymptomatic transmission. This may influence the effec-
tiveness of the standard contact tracing procedure for quarantining potentially infected individuals.
However, the effects of asymptomatic transmission on the epidemic threshold of epidemic spreading
on networks are largely unknown. Here we study the critical percolation transition in a simple
epidemic network model in the presence of a recursive contact tracing algorithm for instant quar-
antining. We find that, above a certain fraction of asymptomatic transmission, standard contact
tracing loses its ability to suppress spreading below the epidemic threshold. However, we also find
that recursive contact tracing opens a possibility to contain epidemics with a large fraction of asymp-
tomatic or presymptomatic transmission. In particular, we calculate the required fraction of network
nodes participating in the contact tracing for networks with arbitrary degree distributions and for
varying recursion depths and discuss the influence of recursion depth and asymptomatic rate on the
epidemic percolation phase transition. We test and illustrate our theoretical results using numerical
simulations on infection trees and networks. We anticipate recursive contact tracing to provide a
basis for digital, app-based contact tracing tools that extend the efficiency of contact tracing to
diseases with a large fraction of asymptomatic transmission.
I. INTRODUCTION
The methods used to fight the spread of the contem-
porary COVID-19 epidemic have largely been the same
as a hundred years ago during the Spanish flu [1, 2]. In
particular, contact tracing has been used as a standard
procedure that is well understood, both analytically
and in network modeling approaches [3–7]. Some early
papers even already considered the concept of recursive
contact tracing, i.e. not only tracing direct contacts but
also contacts of contacts and so on [8, 9]. However,
lacking a technology to efficiently implement such a
procedure, recursive contact tracing has thus far not
been used.
However, the arrival of the SARS-CoV-2 epidemic,
with its high asymptomatic transmission rate and the
possibility of pre-symptomatic infections, presents new
challenges that need addressing [10–12]. As such, a
renewed interest in recursive contact tracing [13–18],
as well as in digital contact tracing solutions [19–30]
that could finally enable recursive contact tracing, has
emerged in an effort to surpass the methods of a hundred
years ago.
In this article, we introduce a simple model that
considers an epidemic as a percolation problem, as is
common in network epidemiology theory [31–40], , in
combination with a recursive contact tracing algorithm
∗ lbaumgarten@itp.uni-bremen.de
† bornholdt@itp.uni-bremen.de
operating on the model. We will study the efficacy of
recursive contact tracing and characterize the influence
of a disease’s asymptomatic transmission rate on the
model’s critical transition. Our model allows for arbi-
trary recursion depths, as has only been done in [14],
and our results, to the best of our knowledge, are the
first to discuss the relationship of recursion depth and
asymptomatic infection rate with regard to the critical
transition.
We find a critical value in the fraction of nodes partic-
ipating in the contact tracing (corresponding to tracing
app usage) which depends on the asymptomatic trans-
mission rate of the disease. Further we find a critical
(maximum allowed) asymptomatic transmission rate as
a function of the algorithm’s recursion depth. We show
that any disease with arbitrary basic reproduction num-
ber and finite asymptomatic rate can be stopped by a
sufficiently large recursion depth. Finally, we validate
our calculations using simulations on infection trees and
networks with different degree distributions, as degree
distribution can have a significant impact on an epidemic
[34, 36, 38, 40–44]. Let us now start by defining the
model.
II. THEORY
We consider an SIR (susceptible, infected, removed)
model with N nodes and an arbitrary degree distribu-
tion p(k) in which a proportion Φ of nodes take part in
contact tracing (“use a contact tracing app”). Nodes in
the network are infected with a virus with symptomatic
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2rate Θ and basic reproduction number R0. It is known
that in such a network, if we fix R0, the disease has a
transmissibility
T = R0
〈k〉
〈k2〉 − 〈k〉 (1)
[36]. Carriers of the disease will be able to infect their
susceptible neighbors with probability T one time step
after being infected themselves and be immune and
non-contagious afterwards.
If an infectious person is symptomatic and uses the
contact tracing app, this will trigger an alarm on the
app and warn neighboring nodes of the chance of being
infected, sending them into quarantine for their one
infectious time step so they effectively skip the infectious
state and jump directly to the recovered stage.
We can consider higher degrees of recursivity r for the
app, meaning how many time steps in the past the app
will consider to guess who might currently be infected.
For r = 0, only the node’s direct neighbors are sent into
quarantine. For r = 1 in addition to those nodes who
are quarantined for r = 0, any node with a distance of
exactly three to the symptomatic node is quarantined,
for r = 2 any node with a distance of five is quarantined,
and so on. This is illustrated in Figure 1. The algo-
rithm disregards any possible immunities due to nodes
having already been infected previously, but it does con-
sider breaks in the infection chain that are caused by
the app’s own quarantining algorithm, i.e., if a node was
quarantined at time t, the app does not consider this
node a possible infection spreader at that time step.
Given a vector ~S of symptomatically infected nodes at
time t0,
Si =
{
1 if node i is symptomatically infected
0 otherwise
,
the vector of nodes ~U using the app, the vectors ~Q(t) of
quarantined nodes and P (t) of not quarantined nodes at
time steps t ≤ t0, and the adjacency matrix A, the vector
of quarantined nodes at t = t0 + 1 can be calculated by
Q(t0 + 1) =
{
A ·
[
~S · ~U · ~P (t0)
]}
· ~P (t0) · ~U︸ ︷︷ ︸
r=0
+
[
A ·
(
A ·
{[
A ·
(
~S · ~U
)]
· ~P (t0 − 1) · ~P (t0 − 2) · ~U
})
· ~P (t0 − 1) · ~P (t0) · ~U
]
· ~P (t0) · ~U︸ ︷︷ ︸
r=1
+ . . .︸︷︷︸
r>1
.
Multiplications with ~P (·) ensure that a considered node
in the backtracking chain was neither quarantined at its
supposed time of infection nor at the time it could have
infected its neighbors, and multiplications with ~U ensure
that all nodes in the backtracking chain use the app.
We now calculate the probability that an infected node
is correctly put into quarantine by our algorithm. For
this, we assume an infinitely large network, with a low
enough fraction of the population being infected that an
infected node is only quarantined as a result of its own
infection chain and not coincidentally swept up in the
quarantine caused by a different infection. We assume
that the clustering in the network is negligible so that we
can consider the infection chain effectively as a tree.
For r = 0, both the infected node and the infecting node
must be part of the network and the infecting node needs
to be symptomatic.
Therefore, a first approximation of the probability P r=0q
of an infected node being correctly put into quarantine
is simply
P r=0q (Φ,Θ) = Φ
2Θ. (2)
However, because the infecting node cannot have been
quarantined, its probability of using the app is
Φ′ =
Φ(1− P
r=0
q
Φ )
Φ(1− P r=0qΦ ) + (1− Φ)
=
Φ− P rq
1− P rq
≤ Φ,
as the amount of nodes using the app with the ability to
infect other nodes is reduced by a factor (1−P r=0q ), and
therefore
P r=0q = ΦΦ
′Θ. (3)
For higher degrees of recursion, the chance of being quar-
3FIG. 1. Illustration of the quarantining algorithm with an
infection spreading from top to bottom. Nodes with a black
outline are not infected (susceptible=S), nodes with a red out-
line are infected (I), either symptomatically (filled nodes, IS)
or asymptomatically (unfilled nodes, IA), and nodes with a
dashed outline are not using the contact tracing app (non-
compliant, NC). Red arrows indicate the spread of the in-
fection, while black lines indicate non-infectious connections
between nodes. The time t indicated on the right hand side
marks the time at which infected nodes are infectious—or,
in the case of the uninfected nodes, the latest time at which
the app would consider them to be possibly infectious. While
nodes could reappear in later time steps, e.g. the node in
the t = 0 row could also be shown in the t = 2 row as it
is connected to (most of) the nodes in the t = 1 row, we
only show nodes once for visual clarity. At time t = 1 a
symptomatic node triggers an alarm on the app. For recur-
sion depth r = 0, only its nearest neighbors are quarantined.
These quarantined nodes cannot infect any other nodes, as
indicated by the blocked outgoing connections. For r = 1,
the app considers every nearest neighbor of the symptomatic
node as a possible origin of the symptomatic node’s infec-
tion, and therefore quarantines all nodes that the infection
could have spread to within two time steps from these near-
est neighbors. This results in every node with a distance of
exactly three to the symptomatic node being quarantined, so
long as the connection is not interrupted by a node not using
the app or by a node that was in quarantine itself at its time
of infection or in the time step after infection, as shown on
the right hand side. This can, of course, also include nodes
which have not yet actually been in contact with any infected
nodes, as shown by the leftmost nodes in the t = 1 and t = 2
rows. Note that, although the infection chain is shown in a
tree-like structure for visual clarity, these nodes can be part
of a network of arbitrary structure.
antined is increased
P r>0q = P
r=0
q + (1− P r=0q )Φ′′P1︸ ︷︷ ︸
r=1
+ · · ·︸︷︷︸
r>1
(4)
= ΦΦ′ [P0 + (1− P0)Φ′′ {P1 + (1− P1)Φ′′ (· · · )}]
(5)
with P0 = Θ (6)
Here, in every part of the sum, the chance of a node hav-
ing already been quarantined due to a lower recursion
level is excluded via (1 − Pi), and a factor Φ′′ is added
for the chance of the next upstream node using the app.
The factor Φ′′ represents the chance of a node using the
app if the next downstream node has not been quaran-
tined, and needs to be used for nodes that are two or more
levels above the currently regarded node in the infection
tree. The chance of such a node using the app regard-
less of the behavior of its downstream nodes is Φ′. The
chance of a downstream node, which is using the app, of
a node that is also using the app not being quarantined
is approximately
(
1− P
r
q
ΦΦ′
)
. Since we assume both in-
fecting node and infected node to be using the app, the
factor ΦΦ′ is removed from P rq . This approximation dis-
regards that the upstream node not being quarantined
also influences the chance of its downstream node being
quarantined. Then the chance of an upstream node using
the app, given that its downstream node is using the app
and has not been quarantined is
Φ′′ =
Φ′
(
1− P
r
q
ΦΦ′
)
Φ′
(
1− P rqΦΦ′
)
+ (1− Φ′)
(7)
=
ΦΦ′ − P rq
Φ− P rq
. (8)
Next, we need to calculate the chance Pi of a node being
quarantined due to the i’th recursion step, given that its
r nearest upstream nodes are using the app. For sim-
plicity’s sake, we start with P1. Here, a leaf node i is
quarantined due to the first recursion step if any of the
downstream nodes of i’s second degree upstream node,
which we call j, have been infected, use the app, and
are symptomatic. The chance of one node fulfilling these
conditions is Φ′ΘT . Since just one node needs to cause
an alarm on the app, the chance of being quarantined is
P1 = 1− (1− ΦΘT )n, (9)
where n is the average number of j’s downstream nodes
minus one. We subtract one, since one of j’s downstream
nodes is i’s direct upstream node and would already have
caused i to be quarantined in the zero’th recursion step,
if it were symptomatic. Since the chance of a node of
degree k being infected is proportional to kp(k) [42], the
average number of downstream nodes minus one is
n =
∑∞
k=2 k(k − 2)p(k)∑∞
k=2 kp(k)
, (10)
where we subtract two from k because of the one down-
stream node that is not considered and j’s upstream
node. Therefore,
P1 = 1− (1−ΘΦT )
∑∞
k=2 k(k−2)p(k)∑∞
k=2
kp(k) (11)
= P1(x)|x=2 = 1− (1−ΘΦT )
∑∞
k=x k(k−x)p(k)∑∞
k=x
kp(k)
∣∣∣∣
x=2
. (12)
We indicate how many connections are removed when
calculating n via the variable x.
For the second recursion step, at least one of the down-
stream nodes of j’s upstream node, which we call l, must
4fulfill the condition of P1, meaning that any one of their
downstream nodes must be infected, using the app, and
symptomatic. This chance is given by
P2 = 1−
[
1− P1(1)Φ˜
]∑∞k=2 k(k−2)p(k)∑∞
k=2
kp(k)
(13)
= P2(x)|x=2 = 1−
[
1− P1(1)Φ˜
]∑∞k=x k(k−x)p(k)∑∞
k=x
kp(k)
∣∣∣∣∣
x=2
(14)
with Φ˜ =
ΦT (1−Θ)
ΦT (1−Θ) + (1− ΦT ) . (15)
Here, in P1(x), we do not discount one of each node’s
downstream nodes, since these nodes are not upstream
nodes of node i, and therefore all of their downstream
nodes need to be considered. Thus, we use P1(1) in-
stead of P1(2). Also, we use Φ˜, because nodes that are
using the app and symptomatically infected would have
already caused a quarantine in a previous time step and
can therefore not be part of the considered tree. Simi-
larly, the equation for following recursion steps is
Pi(x) = 1−
[
1− Pi−1(1)Φ˜
]∑∞k=x k(k−x)p(k)∑∞
k=x
kp(k)
. (16)
Summarizing these calculations, the chance of a leaf node
being quarantined with a recursion degree of r is
P rq ≈ ΦΦ′
r∑
i=0

i−1∏
j=0
[1− Pj(2)] Φ′′
Pi(2)

(17)
with Pi(x) =

Θ if i = 0
1− (1− P0(1)ΦT )n(x) if i = 1
1− (1− Pi−1(1)Φ˜)n(x) otherwise
(18)
and n(x) =
∑∞
k=x k(k − x)p(k)∑∞
k=x kp(k)
(19)
Note that (17) is a self-consistent equation, since Φ′ and
Φ′′ contain P rq .
III. THEORETICAL RESULTS
It is easy to see that the upper limit of P rq is
P rq ≤ ΦΦ′ < Φ if Φ < 1, (20)
so contact tracing by recursive backtracking is strictly
worse than vaccinating a fraction Φ of the population.
Since such a vaccination strategy is already insufficient to
stop an epidemic on an infinitely large scale-free network
with a degree distribution p(k) ∝ k−γ with γ ≤ 3 [42],
recursive backtracking can also not stop such an epidemic
for Φ < 1.
However, there is still something that can be learned from
taking a closer look at scale-free networks. For γ ≤ 3, the
sum
∑k
k=2 k
2p(k) in the exponent of the Pi’s diverges,
therefore P1 → 1 (if ΦΘT > 0), and P rq becomes
P rq = ΦΦ
′ [Θ + (1−Θ)Φ′′] . (21)
We can see that all infected nodes that can be caught by
the algorithm will already be detected in the first recur-
sion step.
Luckily, real world networks are not infinitely large, so
the sum mentioned previously will not diverge, so recur-
sive backtracking will be able to stop epidemics for Φ < 1.
For such networks, we expect the observation made for
infinitely large scale-free networks to be still be relevant,
i.e., the closer a real world network is to an infinitely large
scale-free network, the less will the epidemic threshold Φc
be affected by recursion depths past r = 1.
In Figure 2, we show the reduction of the reproduction
number R = R0(1 − P rq ) as a function of Φ for differ-
ent degree distributions and recursion depths. For de-
gree distributions we choose a simple Erdo˝s-Re´nyi (ER)
network with average degree 〈k〉 = 4, a Baraba´si-Albert
(BA) network with average degree 〈k〉 = 4 and a cutoff
at κ = 1000, i.e. p(k) = 0 for k > κ, and as a realis-
tic example, a scale-free network with exponential cutoff
p(k) ∝ k−2 exp ( k94.2) that produces an epidemic thresh-
old comparable to that of urban networks for SARS [45].
We choose the transmissibility T so that all networks
have a realistic basic reproduction number for the SARS-
CoV-2 virus, R0 = 3, and we choose Θ = 0.5. We see that
the degree distribution only has a minuscule effect on P rq ,
and that increasing the recursion depth past r = 1, while
having the largest effect for ER networks (outer two lines
in the inset), still barely decreases the critical value Φc.
We can also calculate the critical value Φc as a function
of the symptomatic rate Θ, as is shown in Figure 3. There
is a large visible difference between the classic contract
tracing method with r = 0 and recursive contact tracing,
even for relatively large values of Θ. While for r > 0 the
recursion depth has little influence on Φc for large values
of the symptomatic rate Θ, we see that there is a crit-
ical value Θc, depending on the recursion depth, below
which, even with Φ = 1, an epidemic cannot be stopped.
This critical value is approximately halved when going
from the classical method r = 0 to r = 1, meaning that
recursive contact tracing is an effective method to com-
bat diseases with high asymptomatic rates which would
not have been able to be stopped by previous contact
tracing methods.
The critical value Θc is shown in Figure 4 as a function of
the recursion depth for different values of R0. The critical
value Θc exponentially decreases with r, with Θc → 0 for
r →∞. Therefore, any disease with a symptomatic rate
Θ > 0 and arbitrarily large basic reproduction number
R0 can be stopped via recursive contact tracing, given a
sufficiently large recursion depth and app usage rate.
5FIG. 2. Reduction of the reproduction number R as a func-
tion of the app-usage rate Φ for an Erdo˝s-Re´nyi (ER) network,
a Baraba´si-Albert (BA) network with a cutoff κ = 1000, and
a scale-free network with exponential cutoff, with R0 = 3
and Θ = 0.5. The dashed line shows the critical value
R0(1−P rq ) = 1, and the inset is a blowup around the critical
points. The curves of the BA distribution and the scale-free
distribution with exponential cutoff lie so close to each other
that they cannot even be distinguished in the inset.
FIG. 3. Critical value Φc as a function of the symptomatic
rate Θ for different recursion depths r with R0 = 3. Since
the ER distribution and the scale-free distribution with an
exponential cutoff again yield almost the same results, we
only plot Φc for the Baraba´si-Albert distribution with average
degree 〈k〉 = 4 and cutoff κ = 1000.
IV. SIMULATIONS
To test the accuracy of our calculations in section II,
we simulate infection trees with recursive backtracking.
The simulation starts with a single infected node, and
each time step for each infected, unquarantined leaf node
k − 1 downstream nodes are added, with k proportional
to kp(k). These new leaf nodes are infected with prob-
ability T and symptomatic with probability Θ. Then,
according to the rules described in section II, infected
FIG. 4. Critical symptomatic rate Θc below which an epi-
demic cannot be stopped even for Φ = 1 as a function of the
recursion depth r for different basic reproduction numbers
R0 using a Baraba´si-Albert distribution with average degree
〈k〉 = 4 and cutoff κ = 1000. For large recursion depths,
the critical value Θc → 0 for all basic reproduction num-
bers, whereas for r = 1 there is a maximum Θmaxc ≈ 0.28 at
R0 ≈ 3.6.
leaf nodes may be quarantined, causing them to not re-
ceive any downstream nodes. We let these dynamics run
for 100 time steps or until there were 10000 new infected
leaf nodes added in a time step, at which point we con-
sider the epidemic out of control. In Figure 5, we show
the fraction of trees in which the epidemic is not stopped
within 100 time steps, the fraction of quarantined nodes,
and the average reproduction number R for trees using an
ER degree distribution or a BA degree distribution with
a cutoff κ = 1000. We see a very good agreement between
our calculation and simulations for recursions r = 1, see
Figure 5. We have also verified that our calculations and
simulations agree very well for larger recursion depths.
Next, we move away from the tree structure and use
networks instead. In these networks, we start with ten
initially infected nodes, which are chosen with a proba-
bility proportional to kp(k), and we let the dynamics run
until no new nodes are infected within a time step. Fig-
ure 6 shows the fraction of infected nodes, the fraction
of nodes that have ever been quarantined, and the maxi-
mum fraction of nodes that has been quarantined at one
point in time for ER networks with different recursion
depths.
For the network size N → ∞, we see that the fractions
of infected and quarantined nodes drop to zero at the
theoretical critical value Φc. For higher recursion depths
and relatively small networks, the infected fraction is al-
ready kept quite low below the theoretical critical value
because a large fraction of nodes is being quarantined
and therefore the assumption we made in section II that
nodes are not coincidentally swept up in unrelated in-
fection trees does not hold anymore; however, this lower
infected fraction comes at the cost of wrongly quarantin-
ing a relatively large fraction of nodes. Also, this effect
6FIG. 5. Fraction of trees in which the epidemic survives 100 time steps (left column), probability of an infected node being
quarantined P 1q (center column), and reproduction number R (right column) for trees built with an ER degree distribution
(upper row) or a BA degree distribution with cutoff κ = 1000 (lower row), with r = 1, R0 = 3, and Θ = 0.5. Blue lines show
the averages of 100 trees per data point, unbroken orange lines show the theoretical results for P 1q and R, and dashed orange
lines show the theoretical critical value Φc. The dashed black lines in the reproduction number diagrams show the critical
value of R. Note that the measurement for the reproduction number R and the quarantined fraction P 1q are skewed near or
past the critical point, because the measurements here are dominated by just the beginning of the tree where the quarantining
algorithm does not have enough history yet to quarantine nodes.
is mitigated for larger network sizes N .
For BA networks, especially for large networks, the in-
fection dies out quickly even for low values of Φ, because
the infection dynamics are dominated by the strongly
connected hub nodes which, after some time, will be in
the recovered state, and therefore the effective degree dis-
tribution for the infection is quickly cut off for larger k.
Additionally, in a BA network the first few nodes which
are added to the network and later are likely to grow
into the strongest connected nodes are likely to connect
to each other and have common neighbors, meaning that
the assumption we made in section II of low clustering
does not hold, which reduces the number of susceptible
nodes adjacent to an infected large spreader i because its
neighbors are likely to have already been infected by i’s
own infecting node. Both these effects lower the basic re-
production number R0 below the theoretical value given
by equation (1).
V. CONCLUSION
Considering the problem of epidemic spreading of an
infectious disease with a finite asymptomatic transmis-
sion rate, such as the current epidemics caused by the
SARS-CoV-2, we have introduced a combined infection
model of nodes taking susceptible, infected, or recovered
states with a recursive contact tracing algorithm for
quarantining, equivalent to an app used by a network’s
nodes to stop a pandemic in our model.
We have calculated the odds of an infected node being
quarantined by the contact tracing algorithm, as well
as the resulting theoretical critical values for the app
usage rate above which an infection does not percolate
through the network, and the minimum symptomatic
rate beneath which a disease cannot be stopped, de-
pending on the algorithm’s recursion depth, the disease’s
basic reproduction number, and the contact network’s
underlying degree distribution.
We found that the critical app adoption rate and
critical symptomatic rate are both significantly lower for
an algorithm using recursive contact tracing, even with
a low recursion depth, than for the classically employed,
non-recursive method of direct contact tracing. In
fact, any disease with a finite symptomatic rate and
arbitrary basic reproduction number can be stopped
if the app usage rate and recursion depth are large
enough, meaning that recursive contact tracing can be
an effective method for controlling diseases with large
asymptomatic transmission rates which could not have
been stopped with previous contact tracing methods.
7FIG. 6. Fraction of infected nodes (left), fraction of nodes that have ever been quarantined (center), and maximum number of
nodes that have been quarantined at one time (right) for ER networks with recursion depth r = 1 (top row) and r = 2 (bottom
row) as a function of the app-usage rate Φ. Different color graphs show networks of different sizes N , and orange dashed lines
show the theoretical critical value Φc. All data points are the average of 100 simulation runs.
Our critical app adoption rate of over 95% may seem
unusually high at first glance compared to some other
results [5, 20, 24, 26], with other estimates generally
lying between 56% and 95% [46]; however, this is simply
caused by our model’s harsh assumptions, such as a very
high basic reproduction number R0 = 3, a relatively
high asymptomatic rate of 50%, no infection prevention
measures, such as random testing or social distancing,
apart from contact tracing, no distinguishing between
the infectivity of symptomatic and asymptomatic disease
carriers (symptomatic carriers are often assumed to
self-quarantine and therefore infect fewer people), and
a lack of manual contact tracing even for symptomatic
infected individuals who are not using the app. Our
results are comparable to those of other models making
harsh assumptions [14, 16, 23].
Further, we found that, while higher recursion depths
can stop diseases with a high asymptomatic rate, for low
asymptomatic rates, recursion depths higher than one
show very little improvement in the critical app usage
rate while falsely quarantining more uninfected nodes,
implying that for such diseases recursion depths larger
than one are mostly not useful.
Also, the contact network’s degree distribution was
shown to have little impact on these critical values, so
recursive contact tracing is not only viable for Erdo˝s-
Re´nyi graphs, as tested in previous studies, but also
for more realistic scale-free-like networks, i.e. scale-free
networks with a cutoff.
We have ensured the accuracy of our theoretical calcula-
tions using simulations on infection trees and networks
with different degree distributions. We found very good
agreement between our calculations and simulations
for any degree distribution on infection trees and for
Erdo˝s-Re´nyi networks. For Baraba´si-Albert networks,
the simulation’s critical values lay below the calculated
ones because quarantining the most connected nodes
quickly changes the network’s degree distribution and
because the effect of clustering, as highly connected
nodes in Baraba´si-Albert networks are likely to be
connected to each other, was not considered in the
calculations.
The calculations presented here are viable for a simple
model, but we believe that the qualitative conclusions
should be applicable to the real world as well. Future
research should expand this simple model to be more
realistic and possibly fit the infection profiles of real dis-
eases, as well as consider the effect of clustering on the
model’s critical values.
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